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Abstract  
Much of what we know about the alignment of voters with parties comes from 
mass surveys of the electorate in the postwar period or from aggregate electoral 
data. Using individual elector level panel data from the 19th century UK poll 
books, we reassess the development of a party-centred electorate in the United 
Kingdom. We show that (i) the electorate was party-centred by the time of the 
extension of the franchise in 1867; (ii) a decline in candidate-centred voting is 
largely attributable to changes in the behaviour of the working class and (iii) the 
enfranchised working class aligned with the Liberal left. This early alignment of 
the working class with the left cannot entirely be explained by a decrease in vote 
buying. The evidence suggests instead that the alignment was based on the 
programmatic appeal of the Liberals. We argue that these facts can plausibly 
explain the subsequent development of the party system. 
 
Key words: Candidate-vs-party-oriented voting, party development, partisan 
alignment 
JEL classes: C23, D72, N33 
 
1 Introduction
A central element in the political development of a country is the connection between voters
and those who represent them. This connection can take different forms: it may exist due
to patronage, vote buying, or coercion; be based on the personal characteristics or beliefs
of the candidate; or arise due to an affiliation between voters and particular parties. An
important distinction is that between candidate-centred systems and party-oriented ones.
In the latter, voters are loyal to their preferred party and cast their votes without regard to
the personal characteristics, beliefs, or favours offered by candidates.
These patterns of development vary across countries and over time. In the United
States parties that emerged as loose coalitions or caucuses of legislators (Aldrich 1995),
developed into the well-oiled machines of the early nineteenth century that delivered
patronage. As these weakened in the latter part of the century, due in part to civil service
reform as well as the introduction of primary elections, a candidate centred system
emerged (Folke, Hirano, and Snyder 2011). Duverger (1959, p. 28) noted a different pattern
of party development in European parliamentary democracies where “first there is the
creation of parliamentary groups, then the appearance of electoral committees, and finally
the establishment of a permanent connection between these two elements.” According to
Duverger the key factors that lead to the emergence of such party-oriented systems were
the extension of popular suffrage, the role of parliamentary prerogatives, and (later, and in
some countries) the emergence of organized mass parties on the left who connected with
working class voters on the basis of ideology. Indeed, recent work by Hidalgo (2010)
shows that extension of the franchise in Brazil is causally related to the votes shares of
parties with clear ideological profiles. Moreover, Fujiwara and Wantchekon (2013) show
that party-oriented systems, based on parties with clear ideological programmes, can have
positive welfare effects.
It is important then to understand when and why such parties emerge and what are
the institutional (and other) determinants. Much of what we know about the alignment of
2
voters with parties in the developed world comes from mass surveys of the electorate,
developed and implemented in the postwar period, or from aggregate electoral data. The
problem with the former, is that it limits our understanding to changes in party alignment
that occurred after the development of techniques designed to measure such change. The
problem with the latter, is the commonly understood problem of ecological inference: we
can not be sure how aggregate patterns observed in the data relate to individual-level
behaviour.
In this paper we provide a resolution to this problem by analysing historical
individual-level data on actual voting behaviour. Before the establishment of the Ballot Act
in 1872, voting in Parliamentary elections in the United Kingdom was public. Often the
name of each voter and how they voted was recorded in poll books. In addition, these poll
books sometimes provided information, such as electors’ addresses and occupations. Due
to recent work by historians, some poll books have become available electronically. Here
we construct voter level panel data from a sample of 19th century borough constituencies.
Analysing these remarkable data, using appropriate estimation techniques, provides a
unique micro view of the emerging relationship between voters and political parties in
Victorian England.
Our analysis of these data enhances the understanding of party development in several
ways. First, we provide new evidence on the timing of emergence of a party-oriented
electorate in the United Kingdom. Our results corroborate those in the seminal work by
Cox (1984, 1986, 1987) that are based on aggregate data from UK elections and show that
cohesive parties with close links to the electorate preceded the major (late) Victorian
franchise reforms and coincided with a period during which the executive took control of
prerogative. Second, analysis of our data shows that the driving force behind this partisan
alignment was the skilled working classes, who had been enfranchised in 1832. Moreover,
and third we show that this group aligned with the then left Liberal Party.
We also shed light on mechanisms that might explain these patterns in our data, showing
that the increase partisan attachment amongst the electorate can largely be attributed to a
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decrease in vote buying or clientelism. We find, however, that working class voters aligned
with the Liberal Party for reasons other than patronage which, as shown by Stokes et al.
(2013) and Camp, Dixit, and Stokes (2014), was in decline during this period. In fact, our
data is consistent with claims made by Stokes and coauthors and by Cox that the alignment
of the working class had more to do with the programmatic appeal of the Liberal Party.
These results and what they tell us about party alignment in Victorian England have
broad relevance. To our knowledge ours is the first analysis of individual-level data which
confirms that class alignment occurred prior to the enfranchisement of the (unskilled)
working classes and several decades before the development of mass parties that
organised sections of the electorate. In fact the pre-1867 Liberal Party under Palmerston
was a quintessential “cadre party” as defined by Duverger. It was a loose amalgamation of
different parliamentary factions who voted together in parliament and stood on a common
legislative programme, albeit a sparse one. Critically it had no organisational basis within
the electorate. The central lesson then is that class alignment occurred prior to the
development of organised mass parties.
A further lesson involves the dynamic relationship between party support and
programmatic development. That working class voters should align with the left party at
such an early point in Britain’s political development might seem surprising. Palmerston’s
Liberal Party preceded the period of Progressive Liberalism and can not be compared to
Gladstone’s Liberal Party in terms of its programme or legislative achievements. Nor, of
course, was it a party of the workers in the sense that the Labour Party of the interwar
years was to become. And yet is seems plausible that the alignment of the skilled working
class with the Liberal Party set the stage for subsequent developments. More generally,
our data analysis suggests a simultaneous relationship between a party’s support base and
its programmatic appeal. Working class alignment with the Liberal Party that existed
already in the Mid-Victorian era laid the basis for the subsequent progressive platforms of
the Liberal Party that, in turn, cemented its support amongst working class voters.1
1For microfounded models of the the relationship between policies and support bases see Krasa (2017)
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There are several reasons to believe that our insights hold more generally. Extending
our analysis to aggregate data from a large sample of constituencies we find that voter
eligibility is negatively correlated with proxies for the share of unskilled working classes in
the population, whose voting patterns in the aggregate data closely resemble our findings in
the restricted sample. The aggregate data thus suggests that our findings might generalise
to these segments of the Victorian voting population and so provide an accurate picture of
partisan alignment in Britain at that time.
Moreover, it seems likely that our insights travel beyond 19th century Britain to a broader
set of parliamentary democracies. Institutional features such as the centralisation of agenda-
setting power within the executive gave shape to British parliamentary democracy. They
stimulated the development of parties standing on coherent programmes outlining their
plans for government and were mimicked elsewhere. That these features are correlated with
partisan and class alignment in the United Kingdom suggests that similar historical patterns
exist elsewhere. As described by Strøm (2000), the conceptual essence of Parliamentary
government is a “historical evolution” – an accident of 19th century Britain that spread to
other parts of the world.”
Finally, it is worth remembering that 19th century Britain was a developing country
and so our insights might extend over time to those countries that are developing today.
Indeed our finding that a relationship between parties and voters coincided with the
development of programmatic parties without national bases of organisation chimes with
recent work in political development mentioned earlier. These lessons may be informative
in understanding how developing countries today could move from a clientelistic system
to one with programmatic parties (Hicken 2011, Stokes 2005, Wantchekon 2003).
Our paper is organized as follows. We first discuss the institutional setting and introduce
our data. In Section 3, we present our main results. Section 4 discusses some sensitivity
and validity checks. In Section 5, we analyse mechanisms that might explain our findings.
We discuss the external validity of our results in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
and Howell, Krasa, and Polborn (2017).
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2 Institutional Setting and Data
2.1 Victorian Era British Political Landscape
Elections in Britain in the Victorian period under investigation took place under the
first-past-the-post voting system that is still in place. Whilst some constituencies were
single-member districts, most constituencies elected two candidates and a few elected
three and four. From around 1850 constituency elections were contested by candidates
who aligned with one of two major parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals. The
Liberals brought together a loose coalition of (mainly) Whigs, Radicals, and Peelites (a
faction that had broken from the Conservatives) and by 1860 formed a cohesive
parliamentary block. The Whigs were far being a “party” in the sense of having a clear
programme. Nevertheless, candidates who stood on a platform of reducing crown
patronage, expressed sympathy towards nonconformists, and supported the interests of
merchants and bankers, were labelled as Whigs. For convenience, for our analysis of the
years prior to the formation of a cohesive Liberal Party identity we refer to candidates who
are either Whig or Radical as Liberal.
In the period of analysis, the key institutional reforms were the Great Reform Acts. The
first of these, introduced in 1832, introduced several measures that mitigated
malapportionment: increasing representation in the industrialized cities, and taking away
seats from the so-called rotten boroughs with small voting populations. The act also
increased the male franchise to around 650,000. The Representation of the Peoples Act,
otherwise known as the Second Reform Act, was passed by Parliament on August 15th,
1867. The Second Reform Act, that became law in England and Wales in 1867, extended
the franchise in the boroughs to all males over the age of 21 who were inhabitant
occupiers, whether house-owners or tenants, and to male lodgers whose rent was at least
10 pounds per year. A residence of at least one year in the borough was required and
women were still unable to vote. In counties, the franchise was extended to holders of life
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interests, copyholds and leases of sixty years and more worth 5 pounds per annum (from a
previous threshold of 10) and to tenants occupying land worth 12 pounds (from a previous
threshold of 50 pounds per annum).
2.2 Poll Book Data
Prior to the next major reform, The Ballot Act of 1872, individual voting records of
registered voters were public and recorded in so called poll books. This historical fact
provides a novel and reliable window into actual individual political behaviour. Using
these data, we can answer questions previously addressed using less detailed aggregate or
less reliable survey data. While Andrews (1998) shows that poll book data may contain
some errors, they are so rare that they will be insignificant to any empirical analysis. The
main limitations are, in fact, that the information content of the poll books are somewhat
limited and that they are currently available electronically only for a very few districts.
Therefore, the generalizability of the analysis is limited. Nevertheless, and as we shall see,
the fact that we can confirm the very general findings of Cox (1984, 1986, 1987) alleviates
these concerns.
Previously, poll book data have been used mainly in historical research (Drake 1971;
Speck and Gray 1970; Mitchell and Cornford 1977; Phillips and Wetherell 1995), where the
empirical analysis has been very elementary in nature. Accordingly, in a more recent work
Andrews (1998) states that “some work has been done on poll books but in general this
has been confined to an overview of poll books, or as illustration of a point in another
argument”. Indeed, Andrews’ own work (Andrews 1998) is rare in that it utilizes the data
in detail and shows that voters in Sandwich change the party they vote quite often over
time. He supplements this with evidence from other historical records such as candidates’
accounts to conclude that extensive vote buying took place. Nevertheless, that said, the
empirical analysis even in Andrews (1998) is rather crude and indeed no statistical inference
is conducted.
Our focus is on the period after the First Reform Act of 1832 and before The Ballot Act
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of 1872. We use only poll books that contain information on occupation and cover the
transition period from candidate to party-oriented system, that is, 1857-1868 as discussed
by Cox (1986). Given these restrictions, we make use of poll books for a varying number of
general elections held in three boroughs: Ashford (four elections in 1852-1868; Drake and
Pearce 1992), Sandwich (eight elections in 1832-1868; Andrews 2001) and Guildford (eight
elections in 1832-1865; Sykes 1977). Digitized versions of the poll book content are
provided by the UK Data Archive (Ashford, UK Data Archive Study Number 2948;
Sandwich, 4170; Guildford, 977). All poll books record voters’ names and votes. Moreover,
Sandwich and Guildford poll books include also occupations of the voters. For Ashford,
we obtain the occupation information for a fraction of the voters by linking the data with
censuses conducted around the period, directories that also contain occupational
information for some of the voters and lists of landowners. We use a fuzzy merging
algorithm, allowing minor differences in spelling of the first and last names, to link three
censuses (1841, 1851 and 1861), directories from 1851, 1855, 1867 and 1874 and lists of land
owners to the poll book data. After this, we assign each voter occupational and class
information from the closest available source. We were not able to track other poll books
that would both contain information on occupation and cover more than one election
during our period of interest. An example of the typical content included in our poll
books is illustrated below in Figure 1 which shows two pages from Sandwich poll book for
parliamentary elections held in 1857.
We have further classified the occupations in working and middle classes in order to
evaluate class differences in voting behaviour. Our classification follows Best (1972) and
Clapham (2009), where the main classification criteria is a typical income of each
occupation. Table 1 illustrates the occupational composition of the working and middle
classes by showing ten most common professions within each class in our data. These ten
professions always account for at least half of the voters in the respective group and hence
provide fairly comprehensive picture of the classification and the occupations in the data.
While all possible classifications may have their issues and one may need to compromise
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Source: See data documentation for Andrews (2001).
Figure 1. Pages from Sandwich poll book, 1857.
for example between income and social criteria, Table 1 does not reveal any striking
misclassifications, at least from a purely subjective and intuitive perspective.
Table 2 summarizes voting behaviour by class and district. In Sandwich and Guildford
working class tends to give more split votes but party preferences are similar across classes.
In Ashford, the working class gives less split votes and votes more for the Liberals than the
middle class. However, this difference between constituencies will turn out to be mainly a
result of different election years rather than within election year geographic differences.
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Table 1. Ten most common occupations by class and district.
Panel A: Ashford
Middle class (N = 250) Working class (N = 328)
Rank Occupation N Occupation N
1 Grocer 30 Farmer 31
2 Gentry 17 Draper 24
3 Clerk 14 Carpenter 21
4 Merchant 13 Labourer 18
5 Engineer 12 Butcher 16
6 Doctor 11 Shoe maker 16
7 Lawyer 11 Tailor 15
8 Religion 11 Baker 14
9 Chemist 10 Cabinet maker 11
10 House proprietor 9 Coach builder 10
Panel B: Guildford
Middle class (N = 1210) Working class (N = 2097)
Rank Occupation N Occupation N
1 Gentleman 230 Carpenter 174
2 Dealer 150 Shoe maker 157
3 Grocer 133 Baker 123
4 Merchant 72 Tailor 119
5 Doctor 50 Labourer 105
6 Lawyer 48 Butcher 92
7 Innkeeper 46 Blacksmith 72
8 Victualler 43 Brick layer 71
9 Publican 40 Brewer 61
10 Clerk 39 Gardener 56
Panel C: Sandwich
Middle class (N = 3182) Working class (N = 4086)
Rank Occupation N Occupation N
1 Gentry 935 Pilot 379
2 Victualler 305 Mariner 327
3 Grocer 290 Labourer 260
4 Military 211 Shoe maker 208
5 Dealer 128 Carpenter 204
6 Publican 108 Farmer 201
7 Merchant 103 Butcher 187
8 Doctor 95 Gardener 173
9 Clerk 85 Tailor 162
10 Teacher 83 Painter 137
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Table 2. Aggregate level party votes by district and class.
Panel A: Ashford, parliamentary county elections (1852-1865)
Middle class (N = 250) Working class (N = 328)
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Difference
Liberal 0.432 0.496 0.579 0.494 -0.147***
Conservative 0.216 0.412 0.159 0.366 0.057*
Split 0.200 0.401 0.149 0.357 0.051
No vote 0.152 0.360 0.113 0.317 0.039
Panel B: Guildford, parliamentary borough elections (1832-1868)
Middle class (N = 1210) Working class (N = 2097)
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Difference
Liberal 0.392 0.488 0.368 0.482 0.024
Conservative 0.358 0.480 0.299 0.458 0.059***
Split 0.250 0.433 0.333 0.472 -0.083***
No vote N/A
Panel C: Sandwich, parliamentary borough elections (1832-1868)
Middle class (N = 3182) Working class (N = 4086)
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Difference
Liberal 0.455 0.498 0.442 0.497 0.013
Conservative 0.334 0.472 0.362 0.481 -0.029**
Split 0.079 0.270 0.118 0.323 -0.040***
No vote 0.132 0.338 0.075 0.264 0.057***
Notes: Class is unknown for 239, 95 and 46 voters in Ashford, Guildford and Sandwich,
respectively. *, ** and *** denote statistically significant difference in means at 10%, 5% and
1% levels, respectively.
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3 Regression Analysis
In this section, we describe the relationships in our data using regression analysis. The
unit of observation is an individual voter in one election. Most voters are observed and
identified over many elections.
3.1 Partisan Alignment
Political parties with close ties to the electorate are a key feature in the historical
development of parliamentary democracies. When and why did such connections arise?
The question is difficult to address since, as noted by Duverger, and as noted earlier, there
are a myriad of factors that are correlated with and so can plausibly explain the emergence
of a partisan electorate. One approach, that we follow here was pioneered by Cox who
looked at within country variation to disentangle the effects of institutional change that
may be correlated with party development. His analysis of Victorian England remains a
seminal study for understanding the role of parties in parliamentary systems more
generally.
Since Cox’s study it has been understood that cohesive parties with close links to the
electorate preceded the major reforms to the franchise in the late Victorian period, namely
the Second Reform Act of 1867 that enfranchised the unskilled working classes, the
Corrupt Practices Act of 1883 that made it harder for candidates to bribe voters, and the
1884 Reform Act that extended suffrage in the rural counties. In a sequence of papers and
a monograph Cox (1984, 1986, 1987) used descriptive analysis of a long (and wide) panel
of aggregate (district) level data to show that the party orientation of Victorian voters
occurred a decade or so before these defining institutional changes, thus challenging the
conventional wisdom (see for example Nossiter 1975) that Victorian voters aligned with
political parties because of those reforms. He highlighted instead the decline in
parliamentary prerogative in the mid-Victorian period that, when combined with the
centralisation of decision-making authority within a cabinet and the Prime Minister’s
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power of dissolution and use of the confidence vote, weakened the role of the individual
MP. A party-oriented electorate developed as voters used their votes to control the
executive and choose between rival teams: an incumbent government and (Her Majesty’s
Loyal) opposition.2
The institutional developments that Cox describes as bolstering the development of
cohesive parties with close links to the electorate are, of course, found in other
parliamentary democracies and so have been the subject of a large body of theoretical and
empirical research (Huber 1996; Diermeier and Feddersen 1998).
Despite the seminal nature of Cox’s claims, they rest on the use of aggregate data from
constituency elections in nineteenth century Britain. These constituencies differ in many
ways, making it hard to support a causal claim that informal institutional change that
preceded the major reforms of the late nineteenth century had an effect on the emergence
of a party-oriented electorate. Our contribution is in being able, for the first time, to use
individual level voting data, recording actual individual-level voting returns, in order to
address these issues.
Revisiting Cox’s question on the timing of key changes in the English electorate, we
adopt his measure of a party-oriented electorate. During this period most English
constituencies elected two MPs (under plurality rule). Cox’s intuitive argument was that
party-oriented voters would not split their votes between Liberals and Conservatives. Split
votes do not affect the seat allocation between parties. They do, however, affect which
candidates are elected within a party. Cox showed that split level voting (his key indicator
of a candidate-centred electorate) declined dramatically during 1857–1868, and so before
the first election under the new extended franchise (in 1868).
We can check whether regression analysis of our individual-level data corroborates
those earlier findings. Our micro-level analysis allows us to go much further, however, in
2Recent work by Eggers and Spirling (2016a) using micro-level data on parliamentary votes confirm that
parties became cohesive in this period and that this is due to changes in individual behaviour. Eggers and
Spirling (2016b) study speech patterns in parliament to show the centralisation of agenda-setting power by
the executive and the emergence of a shadow cabinet.
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exploring which behavioural voting patterns underpin the decline in split level voting and
the apparent emergence of a partisan electorate. The use of aggregate historical data to
draw inferences about party alignment within the electorate is problematic. Very different
behavioural patterns could be associated with the same vote share, making any inference
difficult to sustain. For example, a party might obtain 50% of the vote share when half of
all voters cast both votes for that party or when each elector casts a split vote. A more
specific problem – that we discuss in Section 6 – arises due to the fact that, when franchise
restrictions are in place, we cannot accurately infer the population of eligible voters.
Cox’s main finding was that split level voting had declined by 1865 and almost to the
level that persisted from 1868 onwards, thus prior to the major institutional change in 1867.
However, during the election year 1857 split voting was as common as in the previous era.
In 1859 split voting was lower than in 1857, but still within the variation of the previous
era. We use these findings to split our sample into two periods: the first contains elections
before 1865; the second, those during and after 1865. We use this classification to conduct
difference-in-difference estimation (DID) that allows us to assess whether in the critical
periods the response of the working class was different to that of the middle class. From
this perspective, working class be seen as the treatment group and middle class as the
control group in the DID. While our main concern is to provide descriptive results on
the timing of changes in political behaviour for different classes, one could give a causal
interpretation to these results if standard DID assumptions are met. The common trend
assumption means that absent a general shift (from candidate-oriented to a party-oriented
system) the outcome of interest for the working class and middle class would have evolved
with the same trends. Moreover, a causal interpretation would require that any change in
the behaviour of the working class in the post-treatment period did not cause a response in
the behaviour of the middle class, i.e. there should be no spill-overs caused by the effect of
interest. If both of these assumptions hold, a causal claim could be made. However, if not,
then DID regressions and graphical illustrations (typical to the DID) still provide a useful
way of describing the phenomenon of interest. Our benchmark specification is as follows:
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yit =αt + β11[Working class]it + β21[Year ≥ 1865]t
+ β31[Working class]it × 1[Year ≥ 1865]t + εit. (1)
We estimate (1) either separately for each constitution or using a pooled data from all of
them, restricting the sample to those voters who turn out to vote. We use either no controls
or election year fixed effects. Note that when we include the election year fixed effects,
we omit 1[Year ≥ 1865]t as this is already captured by the year dummies for 1865 and
1868. For Guildford, we also observe more detailed location (parish) information within
the constituency and therefore include that locality fixed effect. With the pooled data, we
control for the election-constituency fixed effects.
The regression results for split voting are presented in Table 3. From the separate
regressions we find that working class status is a strong and robust predictor of split
voting prior to the 1865 elections (the coefficient related to the variable 1[Working class]).
In Guildford and Sandwich this result is highly significant, but it is imprecise in Ashford.
However, in elections during and subsequent to 1865 we observe that split voting goes
down for all voters (the coefficient related to the variable 1[Year ≥ 1865]). This result is
highly significant in all constituencies and exactly in line with the Cox aggregate level
results.
Our data allows us to go further in assessing heterogeneous effects. In particular, we
observe that subsequent to 1865, the split voting goes down even more for the working
class than the middle class (the coefficient related to the 1[Working class]× 1[Year ≥ 1865]
variable). This main effect of interest is present and robust within all constituencies, but
statistically significant only for Sandwich. The pooled analysis confirms these findings and
all the results are highly significant in the pooled analysis.
As to the interpretation of the coefficients, let us look at specification (6) as an example.
In Sandwich and prior to 1865, 10.4% (Constant = 0.104) of the non-working class voters
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gave split votes and 14.8% of the working class did so (Constant+ 0.044). After and during
1865, 6.3% of the non-working class voters gave split votes (Constant− 0.045) and 6.1% of
the working class did the same (sum of all the reported coefficients). Therefore, while we
observe that split voting decreased across classes the decrease was relatively large amongst
the working class. More specifically, the reduction in split voting amongst the working class
was large enough to bring them to the same level observed in the middle class.
In order to visualize the estimation exercise of Table 3, we plot the share of split votes
among the two classes over time (Figure 2). Our discussion of these results is based on the
bottom-right graph that uses the pooled data. However, for completeness, we also report
separately the individual constituency graphs that deliver the same main message (albeit
with more noise due to obvious sample size reasons).
Doing so we first observe that the split vote share has reasonably common pre-treatment
trends for working and other classes prior to the 1865 elections. This indirectly implies that
the common trend assumption may be realistic and so might allow some causal claims to
be made concerning the main association of interest reported in Table 3. The second key
observation is that prior to 1865 split voting is always more common among the working
class than the middle class. The third key observation is that for the 1865 election, split
voting is about as common in both the groups and in 1868 slightly less common among
the working than the middle class. Finally, and critically we note that the decrease in the
split vote share among the working class was in place already in 1865 and not only in 1868.
This is important because the 1868 elections were affected by the franchise extension of
1867 (Berlinski, Dewan, and Van Coppenolle 2014). Thus we observe that the decline in
split ticket voting amongst the working class precedes the main institutional change of the
Victorian era.
In Appendix Figure A1, we illustrate the same findings further by plotting over time the
class means of the residuals from a regression where split voting is predicted with only the
election year fixed effects. The graphs focus on the relative differences between the classes,
while cleaning out the variation due to time in the occurrence of split voting. The graphs
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show quite clearly the extent to which the behaviour of working class voters converges with
that of middle class ones with respect to split voting. Our results thus corroborate Cox’s
findings and go further in showing that the development of a party-centred electorate in
Victorian England owes much to the change in behaviour of the English working classes.
3.2 Party Alignment
We have shown that a partisan electorate emerged in the United Kingdom in the period
prior to the major institutional reforms and that the main driving force was a change in
the voting behaviour of working class voters. What effect did this have on the emerging
party system? The existence of the classic two-party class based system based on alignment
of the British working class with the left Labour Party (and the corresponding alignment
of the middle classes with the Conservatives) is shown through survey evidence from the
postwar period (Butler and Stokes 1969)–much of the subsequent literature documented its
decline. In the absence of survey data from earlier periods it is hard to show the origins of
class alignment, although there is some evidence that the two-party class based model was
already in evidence in the interwar period and by the time Labour replaced the Liberals
as the main party of the left.3 It is plausible but not proven that a two party class based
system, albeit it one of a different form, emerged much earlier in Britain.4
In Table 4, we analyse how party voting behaviour changes over time.5 We ask whether
the working class voted Liberal more often than other classes prior to the 1865 election and
whether they did so in 1865 and 1868 elections. The analysis is identical to the previous DID
3Estimates showing this effect, and using corrected district level aggregate data, were presented in earlier
work by Carles Boix at the 2001 meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association.
4As noted by Cox (1987, p. 162):
“At some point between the elector in 1851 who observed that, ‘as a tenant-farmer, I well know that when
we are given to understand which way our landlord means to vote, and are canvassed by his steward and
lawyer, we quite understand which way we are expected to go,’ and the elector in 1951 who asserted, rather
more succinctly, ‘I would vote for a pig if my party put one up,’ voting behaviour had clearly changed
considerably.”
5Our conclusions are robust to assigning the outcome variable value 0.5 if a voter casts a split vote between
the parties, although this tones down the magnitude of the estimates slightly.
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Table 3. Regression results on splitting the vote.
Panel A: Ashford
(1) (2)
1[Working class] -0.057 -0.057
[0.085] [0.085]
1[Year≥1865] -0.574***
[0.064]
1[Working class] ×1[Year≥1865] 0.036 0.037
[0.086] [0.087]
Constant 0.623*** 0.629***
[0.062] [0.070]
N 502 502
R2 0.40 0.41
Panel B: Guildford
(3) (4) (5)
1[Working class] 0.088*** 0.094*** 0.091***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020]
1[Year≥1865] -0.166***
[0.026]
1[Working class] ×1[Year≥1865] -0.052 -0.057* -0.049
[0.034] [0.033] [0.033]
Constant 0.282*** 0.441*** 0.259***
[0.016] [0.031] [0.066]
N 3307 3307 3307
R2 0.03 0.14 0.15
Panel C: Sandwich
(6) (7)
1[Working class] 0.044*** 0.041***
[0.010] [0.010]
1[Year≥1865] -0.047***
[0.011]
1[Working class] ×1[Year≥1865] -0.040** -0.037**
[0.016] [0.016]
Constant 0.104*** 0.168***
[0.008] [0.015]
N 6541 6541
R2 0.01 0.04
Panel D: All constituencies
(8) (9) (10) (11)
1[Working class] 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.057*** 0.057***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010]
1[Year≥1865] -0.104***
[0.011]
1[Working class] ×1[Year≥1865] -0.054*** -0.053*** -0.058*** -0.049***
[0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
Constant 0.172*** 0.234*** 0.181*** 0.158***
[0.008] [0.014] [0.014] [0.015]
N 10350 10350 10350 10350
R2 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.16
Election year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Parish/Constituency FE No No Yes No
Election year-Constituency FE No No No Yes
Notes: Only general elections are included. Outcome is a dummy for casting a split vote.
Estimates are conditional on voting. Robust standard errors clustered by voter are reported
in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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analysis on split voting bar the difference in outcome variable. Again, the main coefficient
of interest relates to the interaction variable between working class status and the latter time
period. This can be seen as a difference-in-differences estimate of left voting amongst the
working class in the post 1865 era.
Consistent with the results on split ticketing, we find that during the earlier period,
working class status is a predictor of casting split votes or voting Conservative rather than
Liberal in Guildford and in Sandwich. For Ashford there is also a positive correlation but
this finding is not statistically significant. In Ashford, in the 1865 and 1868 elections, the
Liberal party became much more popular among the middle class than in the earlier period
and this change is statistically significant. In Sandwich and Guilford there is not much
change in the popularity of the Liberals among the middle class. However, in the latter
period, and in all three constituencies, the popularity of the Liberals amongst the working
class increased. This effect of main interest is robust when including controls within all the
constituencies, and the effect is of similar magnitude across constituencies.
In order to interpret these coefficients, we again look at specification (6) in Table 4. Prior
to 1865 52.2% (Constant) of the middle class voters voted Liberal in Sandwich and 45.2%
of the working class did so (Constant − 0.070). After and during 1865, 53.1% of the non-
working class voters voted Liberal (Constant + 0.009) whereas 56.8% of the working class
did so (sum of all the reported coefficients). Thus, whereas the middle class Liberal support
stayed the same, there was a substantial change in the behaviour of the working class. In
sum, we observe an emerging alignment between the working class and the Liberal Party
that, as in the decline in split ticket voting, predates the major institutional reforms of the
late Victorian era.
We visualize the estimation exercise of Table 4 in Figure 3 and and Appendix Figure A2.
When comparing pre-treatment trends between classes with those concerning split voting
(Figure 2) it is less clear that (with respect to class voting) there are indeed common trends.
This makes a causal interpretation of our findings with respect to the timing of the class
basis of partisan voting hard to defend. The second key observation is that typically the
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Liberals were more popular among the middle class than the working class in the earlier
period, whereas in all constituencies the opposite was true in the latter period. The increase
in the Liberal vote share among the working class took place already in 1865 and not only
in 1868, that is, already before the 1867 reform.
In the Appendix A, we repeat the estimations using a sample of by-elections in
Guildford (1858 and 1866) and Sandwich (1841, 1852, 1859 and 1866). In such elections, the
constituents were electing only one candidate to replace a politician whose term was
terminated prematurely (for example, due to the politician passing away). Therefore, the
voters did not have the possibility to cast split votes and the analysis allows us to verify
that the observed change in Liberal voting is also present nevertheless. Table A1
demonstrates that the voting behaviour of the working class voters changed very similarly
after 1865 even in by-elections.
Analysis of our data thus reveals that the probability of left (Liberal) voting was already
significantly higher amongst working class voters in 1865, prior to the introduction of the
Second Reform Act and the introduction of the Secret Ballot in 1872 that was introduced in
part as a way of reducing the political power of patrons over tenants.6 With respect to British
politics this finding is significant in providing the first solid evidence that support for the
Liberal Party amongst the enfranchised skilled working class predates the emergence of the
more progressive or New Liberalism and was established already during the Mid-Victorian
era. That the genesis of the British two party class based system was already in place at this
time suggests that subsequent developments are related to this fact. For example, it seems
plausible that the emergence of a Liberal Party under Gladstone with a radical programme
of reform that appealed to the newly enfranchised working class built on an existing alliance
between workers and Liberals and, in turn, reinforced this relationship.
In sum, we find evidence that two empirical trends – the party orientation of voters and
the class basis of party voting – predate the defining institutional changes of the Victorian
6Studies of the introduction of the Secret Ballot elsewhere shows strong evidence of its impact on the
voting behaviour of relatively poor voters (Baland and Robinson 2008).
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era. Later we shall try and explore which mechanisms can explain these facts. Before doing
so we check how sensitive is our analysis to different specifications.
4 Additional Sensitivity Analysis
As already noted, any causal claims that could be made with respect to the behaviour
of working class voters, based on our DID estimates, rest on the assumption of common
pre-treatment trends. In Figure 4, we formally test for common pre-treatment trends for
both main outcomes using the pooled data from all the constituencies. We achieve this by
estimating the following model which resembles a typical dynamic difference-in-differences
specification:
yit = γ+ δ11[Working class]it +∑
t
{δ2tYeart + δ3tYeart × 1[Working class]it}+ ζit. (2)
Figure 4 reports only the δ3t coefficients for each t. We set the base year to 1859, i.e. the
last year before our treatment period. The last two coefficients (1865 and 1868) relate to the
actual treatment period of interest. That actual result of interest seems to be robust to
allowing a different coefficient for each year, since three out of four coefficients are
statistically significant. If, however, the coefficients related to years prior to 1865 were
shown to be statistically significant then the hypothesis of common pre-treatment trends
would be rejected. In one out of 14 cases is this in fact the case. While this may be an
indication of potential issues, it may also be due to multiple testing.
We explore the robustness of our main results to alternative social class divisions by
reclassifying the voters mimicking Eriksson and Goldthorpe’s (1992) five-class scheme as
closely as possible (see also Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). First, we show in Table 5
that the decline in split votes comes mainly from skilled workers and petty bourgeoisie, all
mostly belonging to the working class. Second, we verify in Table 6 that the alignment with
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Table 4. Regression results on the association between working class status and voting for
the Liberals for pre- and post-1865 elections.
Panel A: Ashford
(1) (2)
1[Working class] 0.112 0.111
[0.077] [0.077]
1[Year≥1865] 0.430***
[0.065]
1[Working class] ×1[Year≥1865] 0.008 0.007
[0.089] [0.089]
Constant 0.217*** 0.200***
[0.054] [0.055]
N 502 502
R2 0.18 0.18
Panel B: Guildford
(3) (4) (5)
1[Working class] -0.043 -0.037 -0.033
[0.028] [0.028] [0.028]
1[Year≥1865] 0.013
[0.036]
1[Working class] ×1[Year≥1865] 0.117*** 0.111** 0.101**
[0.045] [0.045] [0.046]
Constant 0.389*** 0.418*** 0.794***
[0.024] [0.034] [0.100]
N 3307 3307 3307
R2 0.01 0.08 0.09
Panel C: Sandwich
(6) (7)
1[Working class] -0.070*** -0.063***
[0.020] [0.020]
1[Year≥1865] 0.009
[0.024]
1[Working class] ×1[Year≥1865] 0.107*** 0.101***
[0.032] [0.032]
Constant 0.522*** 0.528***
[0.016] [0.021]
N 6541 6541
R2 0.01 0.04
Panel D: All constituencies
(8) (9) (10) (11)
1[Working class] -0.062*** -0.060*** -0.055*** -0.051***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
1[Year≥1865] 0.047**
[0.020]
1[Working class] ×1[Year≥1865] 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.108***
[0.026] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025]
Constant 0.473*** 0.501*** 0.538*** 0.520***
[0.013] [0.018] [0.018] [0.020]
N 10350 10350 10350 10350
R2 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.08
Election year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Parish/Constituency FE No No Yes No
Election year-Constituency FE No No No Yes
Notes: Only general elections are included. Outcome is a dummy for casting a Liberal vote.
Estimates are conditional on voting. Robust standard errors clustered by voter are reported
in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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the Liberals happens among the non-skilled workers, skilled workers and petty bourgeoisie.
In Appendix Tables A4 and A5 we demonstrate how our middle and working classes and
different occupations map into the Eriksson-Goldthorpe classification.
We provide additional analysis in Appendix A. In Table A2, we study whether the results
are robust to excluding those voters from the sample who voted for the first time in 1868
elections in Ashford or Sandwich.7 While the fact that original poll book data for Sandwich
excluded voters enfranchised in 1867 implies that results concerning Sandwich should not
be attributed to the reform, there are some voters who were eligible to vote before but did
not exercise their right to do so. The results remain the same after excluding these voters
from the estimation sample.
We observe some of the voters multiple times and some of them move between social
classes. Thus, it is possible to include voter fixed effects in our estimations.8 We study the
robustness of our results to including these fixed effects in Table A3. The results concerning
split voting are very similar even after the voter fixed effects are included. However, the
coefficient of the interaction term is slightly toned down in the case of Liberal voting once
the fixed effects are introduced.
Finally, we check that the elections are similar across years. In Table A6, we report the
available candidates for each election. For Ashford we report the election results from the
entire constituency of Kent Eastern, of which, Ashford is part of. In all the constituencies
there are either three or four candidates in every election. There is no striking difference
between the pre- and post-treatment years, and thus, changes in available candidates are
unlike to explain our findings.
7See also Berlinski and Dewan (2011) who study the political consequences of franchise extension. They
show that there is no evidence relating Liberal support to changes in the franchise rules, although the Second
Reform Act did affect electoral competition and candidate selection.
8We include only voters who are observed at least twice in this analysis. This changes our estimation
sample slightly.
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Figure 4. Coefficients from dynamic difference-in-differences estimation.
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Table 5. Split voting using Eriksson-Goldthorpe classification.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1[Non-skilled worker] 0.055** 0.063** 0.078*** 0.074***
[0.028] [0.027] [0.025] [0.023]
1[Skilled worker] 0.055*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.053***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.014]
1[Farm worker] 0.130*** 0.137*** 0.112*** 0.096**
[0.037] [0.036] [0.037] [0.038]
1[Petty bourgeoisie] 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.055*** 0.055***
[0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011]
1[Year≥1865] -0.101***
[0.011]
1[Non-skilled worker] ×1[Year≥1865] -0.011 -0.018 -0.019 -0.025
[0.039] [0.038] [0.037] [0.035]
1[Skilled worker] ×1[Year≥1865] -0.042* -0.038 -0.048** -0.041*
[0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.023]
1[Farm worker] ×1[Year≥1865] -0.140*** -0.145*** -0.139*** -0.099*
[0.050] [0.049] [0.053] [0.051]
1[Petty bourgeoisie] ×1[Year≥1865] -0.064*** -0.065*** -0.066*** -0.057***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.015]
Constant 0.170*** 0.233*** 0.181*** 0.159***
[0.008] [0.014] [0.014] [0.015]
N 10350 10350 10350 10350
R2 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.16
Election year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Parish/Constituency FE No No No Yes
Election year-Constituency FE No No No Yes
Notes: Only general elections are included. Outcome is a dummy for casting a split vote.
Estimates are conditional on voting. Data from all three constituencies are pooled together.
Robust standard errors clustered by voter are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 6. Liberal voting using Eriksson-Goldthorpe classification.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1[Non-skilled worker] -0.068* -0.069* -0.083** -0.075**
[0.038] [0.038] [0.037] [0.037]
1[Skilled worker] -0.096*** -0.089*** -0.087*** -0.082***
[0.023] [0.024] [0.023] [0.023]
1[Farm worker] -0.112*** -0.127*** -0.112*** -0.105**
[0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043]
1[Petty bourgeoisie] -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.042** -0.040**
[0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018]
1[Year≥1865] 0.045**
[0.020]
1[Non-skilled worker] ×1[Year≥1865] 0.079 0.079 0.084 0.082
[0.055] [0.055] [0.055] [0.054]
1[Skilled worker] ×1[Year≥1865] 0.124*** 0.117*** 0.119*** 0.108***
[0.040] [0.040] [0.040] [0.039]
1[Farm worker] ×1[Year≥1865] 0.185*** 0.194*** 0.174** 0.142**
[0.069] [0.068] [0.068] [0.067]
1[Petty bourgeoisie] ×1[Year≥1865] 0.116*** 0.119*** 0.118*** 0.111***
[0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028]
Constant 0.475*** 0.504*** 0.540*** 0.523***
[0.013] [0.018] [0.018] [0.020]
N 10350 10350 10350 10350
R2 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.08
Election year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Parish/Constituency FE No No No Yes
Election year-Constituency FE No No No Yes
Notes: Only general elections are included. Outcome is a dummy for casting a Liberal vote.
Estimates are conditional on voting. Data from all three constituencies are pooled together.
Robust standard errors clustered by voter are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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5 Ideological Appeal or Decline in Vote Buying?
What explains the development of emergence of a party-oriented electorate at this time?
Or, as Duverger asked “how did we pass from the system of 1850 to that of 1950”? Having
shown that a key factor (already in Mid-Victorian England) was an alignment of the
working classes with the Liberal Party, we next try to understand the mechanisms that lie
behind that alignment. According to Duverger the key factors that lead to the emergence
of party-oriented systems were the extension of popular suffrage, the role of parliamentary
prerogatives, and the emergence of organized mass parties on the left who connected with
working class voters on the basis of ideology.
We have shown that two empirical trends – the party orientation of voters and the class
basis of party voting – predate the major franchise reform of 1867. By extension it can
not be the case that organized mass parties played a role, for they did not exist at that
time. As shown by (Hanham 1959), the process of developing national party organizations
able to support country-wide candidacies and campaigning activities did not begin until
after the Reform Act of 1867. Prior to this, political parties in the United Kingdom were
quintessential cadre parties, as defined by Duverger, namely coalitions of legislators who
voted together on issues and stood for election on a common programme. The need for
parties to develop coherent programmes was enhanced by the decline in parliamentary
prerogative and centralisation of executive power that occurred a decade or so prior to the
major institutional reforms. It is plausible then that, on the basis of such programmes, and
even in the absence of mass party organization, an ideological affinity emerged between the
skilled working classes and the Liberal Party.
However, there is another plausible explanation that relates to the fact that 19th century
elections were characterized by the presence of vote buying. Political parties and
candidates offered voters money or other types of benefits in exchange for their votes and
even gathered information on voters’ debts, crimes and infidelities to gain leverage over
them (Stokes et al. 2013; Camp, Dixit, and Stokes 2014). As shown in several studies, the
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introduction of the secret ballot in 1872 led to a substantial decrease in vote buying (Cox
1987; Kam 2017). Camp, Dixit, and Stokes (2014) argue that the changes in political and
economic environment before the ballot reform were also important. As larger groups
were enfranchised and the median income of the electorate increased, bribing voters
became more expensive and less beneficial for the candidates. Closely related to these
arguments, Cox (1987) links the decline of vote buying in 19th century England with the
growth of electoral districts which also meant that a fixed amount of money would buy a
smaller proportion of votes. Moreover, Cox argues that the power of individual MPs was
declining during the 19th century. For instance, while individual MPs were previously
processing private bills which conferred, for example, divorces, canals and railroads, these
among some other responsibilities were moved to courts and bureaus. As local lords could
benefit less from having their own MP, also the incentives to buy votes became smaller.
The argument that vote buying was a problem in Mid-Victorian England but became
less so towards the 1872 reform raises an important question: Was the decline in split
voting and working class alignment with the Liberals merely due to vote buying becoming
less common? We can shed some light on this question by focussing on the behaviour of
occupational groups that were particularly susceptible to vote buying.9
To identify these occupational groups, we define a procedure that that builds upon
arguments made in previous research that radical inconsistencies or volatility in voting
behaviour across different elections can be treated as an indication of vote buying (see
Andrews 1998).10
9The previous literature on Victorian voting behaviour has argued that some occupational groups were
more prone to vote buying than others (Andrews 1998). For instance, local lords could pressure small
entrepreneurs such as shopkeepers by threatening with boycotts if they did not cast at least one vote for
the lord’s candidate (Cox 1987). Hence, it is justifiable to define the vulnerability to vote buying at the
occupational instead of the individual-level. Another rationale for this choice is that an individual voter
changing his voting decisions once or twice may be entirely normal but a large fraction of voters in a whole
occupational group changing its voting behaviour would lead one to suspect vote buying. Moreover, more
than one election would probably be needed to define the likeliness of being affected by vote buying at the
individual level. This would mean unnecessary loss of some data.
10Andrews (1998) writes that radical changes in voting behaviour is not itself an indication of vote buying.
However, he also notes that certain occupational groups were more likely to switch their electoral behaviour
across elections and speculates that these voters were a group of people who “might be very glad of the
additional income that a well-placed bribe, however neatly colored, might provide”.
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First, we define a dummy for changing voting behaviour from the previous election for
each voter. This dummy gets value one if a voter switches from Conservative (Liberal)
to Liberal (Conservative) or split vote or from split vote to Conservative or Liberal vote.
Then, we compute the average of this measure for all occupations using data from the
period before 1865, i.e. our pre-treatment period. The measure serves as a proxy for the
propensity to be affected by vote buying. Finally, we define a dummy for belonging to a
group likely affected by vote buying by splitting the sample by different thresholds (50th
and 75th percentile) in the average volatility measure.
The group of volatile voters includes both working and middle class. A slight majority,
roughly three out of five, of these volatile voters belong to the former. Voters classified
as volatile often work as, for instance, small entrepreneurs such as shoe makers, dealers,
innkeepers and tailors and laborers. Indeed, these occupations overlap partially with those
groups that Andrews (1998) suspects were more likely affected by vote buying in Sandwich.
We employ the pooled data set consisting of all three constituencies and estimate
equations of form
yit =λ+ θ11[Working class]it + θ21[Volatile voter]it + θ31[Year ≥ 1865]t+
θ41[Working class]it × 1[Year ≥ 1865]t + θ51[Year ≥ 1865]t × 1[Volatile voter]it + ηit.
(3)
Contrary to our previous estimations, we redefine the working class dummy so that the
class includes only consistent voters (who are less likely to be affected by vote buying).
We can then interpret the coefficients for the group dummies and their year interactions
as effects relative to those amongst middle class voters who were consistent in their voting
behaviour.
The estimation results are shown in Tables 7 (split voting) and 8 (Liberal votes). The
first conclusions that we can draw from these tables are in line with results discussed in
previous sections. First, we find that being a consistent working class voter is a strong and
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robust predictor of split and Liberal voting prior to the 1865 elections (the coefficient related
to the Working class variable), the coefficients being statistically significant and positive and
negative, respectively. Second, split voting goes down for all voters (the coefficient related
to 1[Year ≥ 1865]t) in elections during and subsequent to 1865.
Here, however, our question of interest is what happens to working class and volatile
voters’ behaviour in 1865 and after, i.e. the coefficients related to the interaction terms. First,
it appears that being a consistent working class voter is only weakly associated with split
voting after 1865. The estimated coefficients are rather small, around 2− 3%, and barely
significant in some specifications. On the contrary, most of the decrease in split voting
comes from volatile voters who change their voting behaviour. The estimates are much
larger in absolute terms and statistically highly significant. This is perhaps what one would
expect to see, if we have indeed classified those groups affected by vote buying properly
and vote buying became less common during our post-treatment period.
In Appendix Tables A7 and A8, we re-estimate equation 3 but split the group of volatile
voters into volatile working class voters and volatile middle class voters, and contrast their
and consistent working class voters’ outcomes to those of consistently voting members of
the middle class. These tables show that the effects for the volatile voters mainly come from
the volatile working class voters changing their behaviour.
Furthermore, however, we observe that both the consistent working class and volatile
working class voters aligned with the Liberals. The estimates are positive and statistically
significant and slightly larger for the volatile voters. We can conclude then that working
class alignment with the Liberals cannot be completely explained by a decline in vote
buying. This suggests that other factors were important also. While we do not directly
observe the effect, the patterns in our data are consistent with claims that working class
voters were attracted to the programmatic appeal of the Liberal Party. Stokes et al have
argued that the diminishing role of agents reduced the advantages of vote buying and so
led parties to develop different (ideological) appeals that targeted groups of voters rather
than individual ones. Such programmatic appeals can be seen as a coordinated partisan
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response to the institutional and socio-demographic changes that broke the stranglehold of
the brokers and aligned groups (or classes) of voters with parties on the basis of ideology.
Recently, others have argued (alongside Stokes) that such programmatic appeals are a
critical element in political and economic development (see for example, Acemoglu and
Robinson 2012, Chapter 11). For example, Fujiwara and Wantchekon (2013) argue that
programmatic appeals can enhance welfare and use evidence from Benin that such appeals
are also optimal for candidates under some circumstances. We view our analysis as
complimentary to that of Stokes. Whereas she provides case study evidence that parties
were incentivised to develop ideological appeals, ours is (we believe) the first quantitative
analysis that is consistent with the claim that voters responded to such appeals.
6 External Validity
The advantages of using rich data such as ours means that we can avoid some pitfalls when
making inferences from more aggregated data. Nevertheless, a limitation of the poll book
data is that they are available for only three constituencies. In this section we assess those
potential pitfalls (of using aggregate data) while analysing whether some of our findings
may generalise to a larger sample.
In order to do so we use aggregate constituency level data from Eggers and Spirling
data set.11 We merge this data with that from the 1861 census obtained from the UK Data
Archive (Gatley et al. 2000). Besides limiting the data to those constituencies that we could
link with the census info, we restrict the sample to constituencies that are present for more
than five elections between 1835 and 1868 (we omit the entire year 1832, because the data
are relatively scarce then). Moreover, we only include constituencies that are present in
both our before and after periods. These restrictions are needed to ensure comparison of
how voting behaviour evolves in the same constituencies over time. We are left with 117
constituencies.
11These data are available online in http://andy.egge.rs/data.html; see, for example, Eggers and
Spirling (2014).
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First, we analyse how these 117 constituencies compare to those used in the main
analysis. In Figure 5, we report a histogram of working class shares while marking the
location of our three constituencies, based on poll book data and the census, by vertical
red lines. We use the 1861 census information to measure the working class share in these
constituencies, and include only constituencies which have elections in 1859. The census is
available for Guildford, but not for Sandwich. For Ashford, we use the census information
from Kent, which Ashford is a part of.
Based on both of these measures, we observe that our three constituencies have fewer
working class residents than is typical in the entire sample. If it were the case that the areas
with a larger share of working class were more likely to vote Liberal (we show that this is
so) then this suggests that our estimates represent bounds for the alignment of the working
class and Liberals.
The closest we can come to our voter-level DID analysis is to compare how voting
behaviour evolves in constituencies that have a large working class share relative to
constituencies that have a smaller share. Accordingly, the first limitation of the aggregate
data when compared to voter level data is that the analysis takes places between rather
than within constituencies. This leads us to a second and further issue with the aggregate
data: The share of working class measure is available only for the one census year (and we
have no idea how that evolves over time). A third issue is that the occupation information
in the census follows a more aggregate classification than the poll book information.
Perhaps the most important issue concerning use of aggregate data, however, is that
we do not have information on the share of eligible voters, neither overall nor (and in
particular) within each occupation. This is reflected, for example, in Figure 5 that shows the
working class shares based on census measures are much larger than the respective shares
in the poll book data. This is important since it implies that we cannot separate whether a
(possible) correlation between working class share and the Liberal vote share is driven by
voter alignment or by the eligibility to vote. For example, comparing across constituencies
using aggregate data one might find that working class share is negatively correlated with
36
Liberal vote share, even though, at the individual level, working class voters are more likely
to vote Liberal. This is due to the possibility that, because of franchise restrictions, as the
share of working class in a constituency goes up then the share of middle class voters goes
up also.
To address this issue, we group the working class into on average low skilled occupations
of agriculture, mining, domestic service and labourer, and into on average high skilled
occupations of building, manufacturing and transportation. The latter group will contain
a larger share of eligible voters. We construct a proxy of voter eligibility share as the
total votes in constituency divided by the number of adult males who gain wages in year
1861. Since women and men who received no wages were disenfranchised the numerator
is never larger than the denominator. In Figure 7, we show that the share of low-skilled
working class is indeed negatively correlated with eligibility, whereas the share of high-
skilled is positively correlated. For the sake of clarity, the figures show binned averages
within twenty bins with equal number of observations and linear fits.
In Figure 8, we conduct graphically the aggregate level attempt to mimic our difference-
in-difference analysis. We report how Liberal vote share evolves in municipalities in two
groups with above or below median share of low (high) skilled working class. Given the
limitations imposed by the data, lacking clear common pre-treatment trends, and given
that none of the estimated effects turn out to be statistically significant (not reported), these
figures should be taken merely as tentative descriptive evidence. In Panel A, the pattern
is opposite to the micro-level findings, while Panel B shows a similar pattern. Given this,
the main results of this paper concerning the alignment of the working class with the left
seems more likely to generalize to the behaviour of low skilled working class. However,
given the limitation of this analysis, one should not draw too strong a conclusion one way
or the other.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented new evidence concerning the emergence of party-oriented
systems in which voters, or classes of voters, align with parties on the basis of ideology.
Recent work on developing countries has reinvigorated debates surrounding how and why
such parties emerge and what are the welfare consequences. However, very little is actually
known about how such parties emerged in the developed world. Much of what we know
about the alignment of voters with parties comes from mass surveys of the electorate in
the postwar period or from aggregate electoral data. Since techniques to evaluate them
were established after party-oriented systems emerged, surveys will do little to help us
understand the genesis of such systems and possible path dependency. Inferences drawn
from aggregate data are also subject to several caveats and this is particularly so when
assessing voting data when franchise restrictions are in place. Indeed, as we have shown,
when assessing the propensity of specific groups to vote for particular parties, we are unable
to separate whether correlations are driven by voter alignment or by the eligibility to vote
within that group.
Our paper has instead shed new light on the emergence of party-oriented systems using
individual elector level panel data from the 19th century UK poll books. Evidence based
on this data shows that the electorate was party-centred by the time of major franchise
reform and that the decline in candidate-centred voting is largely attributable to changes
in the behaviour of the working class who aligned with the Liberal left. Furthermore, the
evidence suggests that this alignment was based on programmatic appeal.
Although our data is rich, the sample is relatively small and this raises concerns about
external validity. Future work should then seek to replicate these findings in a broader
sample of constituencies. Nevertheless, analysis of the aggregate data suggests that our
findings do generalise to the broader sample of constituencies and so provide an accurate
picture of party alignment in Victorian Britain.
More general lessons stem from our analysis and these are relevant both to
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understanding party development in the developed and developing world. With respect to
the former, our analysis suggests that the genesis of Britain’s class based two-party system
can be found almost a century before the survey based evidence of its existence (and
subsequent decline). Indeed, as we have argued, it is plausible that the early orientation of
working class voters to the Liberals stimulated the later development of class alignment
and that similar historical patterns exist elsewhere. Intriguingly, the emergence of the
observed pattern of partisan and class alignment occurred in the absence of parties with
any semblance of organisation within the electorate and seems to have been formed on the
basis of programmatic appeal. This speaks to recent findings by Wantchekon (2003) and
Fujiwara and Wantchekon (2013) who present evidence that programmatic politics can be
a viable alternative to clientelistic forms of engagement in the developing world where
party organisation is thin on the ground.
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Table A1. Regression results using data from by-elections.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1[Working class] -0.063*** -0.050** -0.050** -0.050**
[0.023] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022]
1[Year≥1865] -0.105***
[0.022]
1[Working class] ×1[Year≥1865] 0.149*** 0.134*** 0.135*** 0.135***
[0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029]
Constant 0.548*** 0.501*** 0.501*** 0.501***
[0.018] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
N 5167 5167 5167 5167
R2 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04
Election year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Constituency FE No No Yes No
Notes: Only by-elections in Guildford (1858 and 1866) and Sandwich (1841, 1852, 1859 and
1866) are included. Outcome is a dummy for casting a liberal vote. Estimates are conditional
on voting. Robust standard errors clustered by voter are reported in brackets. *, ** and ***
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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A5
Table A4. 10 most common occupations and different classifications.
Panel A: Ashford
Eriksson-Goldthorpe class Middle class (N = 250) Working class (N = 328)
White-collar workers
(N = 208)
Grocer, gentry, clerk,
merchant, doctor, lawyer,
priest, chemist, house
proprietor
Petty bourgeoisie (N = 35) Draper
Farm workers (N = 33) Farmer
Skilled workers (N = 172) Carpenter, butcher, shoe
maker, tailor, baker, cabinet
maker, coach builder,
Non-skilled workers
(N = 54)
Labourer
Panel B: Guildford
Eriksson-Goldthorpe class Middle class (N = 1210) Working class (N = 2097)
White-collar workers
(N = 1167)
Gentleman, dealer, grocer,
merchant, doctor, lawyer,
innkeeper, victualler,
publican, clerk
Petty bourgeoisie (N = 95)
Farm workers (N = 98) Gardener
Skilled workers (N = 1492) Carpenter, shoe maker, baker,
tailor, butcher
Non-skilled workers
(N = 455)
Labourer
Panel C: Sandwich
Eriksson-Goldthorpe class Middle class (N = 3182) Working class (N = 4068)
White-collar workers
(N = 2699)
Gentry, victualler, grocer,
military officer, dealer,
publican, merchant, doctor,
clerk, worker in education
Petty bourgeoisie
(N = 146)
Farm workers (N = 373) Farmer, gardener
Skilled workers (N = 2418) Pilot, shoe maker, carpenter,
butcher, tailor, painter
Non-skilled workers
(N = 905)
Labourer, mariner
A6
Table A5. 10 most common occupations and different classifications.
Eriksson-Goldthorpe class Middle class Working class
Farm worlkers 0 504
Non-skilled workers 0 1414
Petty bourgeoisie 110 166
Skilled workers 0 4082
White-collar workers 4074 0
A7
Ta
bl
e
A
6.
C
an
di
da
te
s
in
el
ec
ti
on
s.
Pa
ne
lA
:K
en
t,
Ea
st
er
n
(A
sh
fo
rd
)
Pa
ne
lB
:G
ui
ld
fo
rd
Pa
ne
lC
:S
an
dw
ic
h
El
ec
ti
on
El
ec
to
rs
C
an
di
da
te
s
Pa
rt
y
Vo
te
s
El
ec
ti
on
El
ec
to
rs
C
an
di
da
te
s
Pa
rt
y
Vo
te
s
El
ec
ti
on
El
ec
to
rs
C
an
di
da
te
s
Pa
rt
y
Vo
te
s
18
52
71
19
Si
r
E.
C
.D
er
in
g,
Bt
.
L
30
63
18
32
34
2
J.
M
an
gl
es
L
29
9
18
32
91
6
J.
M
ar
ry
at
L
49
5
W
.D
ee
de
s
C
28
79
C
.B
.W
al
l
C
18
0
Si
r
E.
T.
Tr
ou
br
id
ge
,B
t.
L
48
5
Si
r
B.
W
.B
ri
dg
es
,B
t.
C
23
56
H
on
.C
.F
.N
or
to
n
L
13
8
S.
G
.P
ri
ce
C
36
1
18
57
80
00
Si
r
B.
W
.B
ri
dg
es
,B
t.
C
23
79
18
35
53
7
J.
M
an
gl
es
L
29
9
Si
r
E.
W
.C
.R
.O
w
en
C
26
5
Si
r
E.
C
.D
er
in
g,
Bt
.
L
23
58
C
.B
.W
al
l
C
21
4
18
35
93
4
S.
G
.P
ri
ce
C
55
1
W
.D
ee
de
s
C
22
16
H
.A
.C
.A
us
te
n
L
13
1
Si
r
E.
T.
Tr
ou
br
id
ge
,B
t.
L
40
5
E.
A
.A
ch
es
on
L
12
7
18
37
42
5
C
.B
.W
al
l
C
25
2
Si
r
E.
W
.C
.R
.O
w
en
C
38
9
18
65
82
50
Si
r
B.
W
.B
ri
dg
es
,B
t.
C
32
08
H
on
.J
.Y
.S
ca
rl
et
t
C
18
8
18
37
91
1
Si
r
E.
T.
Tr
ou
br
id
ge
,B
t.
L
41
6
Si
r
E.
C
.D
er
in
g,
Bt
.
L
31
95
J.
M
an
gl
es
L
15
9
Si
r
J.
R
.C
ar
na
c,
Bt
.
L
40
1
Si
r
N
.J
.K
na
tc
hb
ul
l,
Bt
.
C
29
19
18
41
48
6
R
.D
.M
an
gl
es
L
24
2
S.
G
.P
ri
ce
C
37
0
18
68
13
10
7
E.
L.
Pe
m
be
rt
on
C
52
31
C
.B
.W
al
l
L
22
1
Si
r
B.
W
.B
ri
dg
es
,B
t.
C
33
0
H
on
.G
.W
.M
ill
es
C
51
04
H
on
.J
.Y
.S
ca
rl
et
t
C
17
7
18
47
94
3
Lo
rd
C
la
re
nc
e
Pa
ge
t
L
45
9
H
.J
.T
uf
to
n
L
46
85
H
.C
ur
ri
e
C
16
1
C
.W
.G
re
nf
el
l
L
43
7
Si
r
J.
C
ro
ft
,B
t.
L
45
79
18
47
58
5
H
.C
ur
ri
e
C
33
6
Lo
rd
C
ha
rl
es
C
lin
to
n
C
39
2
R
.D
.M
an
gl
es
L
24
2
18
57
10
08
E.
H
.K
.H
ug
es
se
n
L
54
7
T.
L.
Th
ur
lo
w
C
18
4
Lo
rd
C
la
re
nc
e
Pa
ge
t
L
50
3
18
52
64
8
R
.D
.M
an
gl
es
L
27
0
J.
M
cG
re
go
r
C
32
2
J.
Be
ll
L
25
1
J.
La
ng
L
24
T.
L.
Th
ur
lo
w
C
18
4
18
59
10
30
E.
H
.K
.H
ug
es
se
n
L
49
7
18
57
66
6
R
.D
.M
an
gl
es
L
34
9
Lo
rd
C
la
re
nc
e
Pa
ge
t
L
45
8
W
.B
ov
ill
C
33
8
Si
r
J.
Fe
rg
us
so
n,
Bt
.
C
40
4
J.
Be
ll
L
16
7
W
.D
.L
ew
is
C
32
8
18
65
66
7
G
.J
.H
.M
.E
.O
ns
lo
w
L
33
3
18
65
10
54
E.
H
.K
.H
ug
es
se
n
L
49
4
W
.B
ov
ill
C
31
8
Lo
rd
C
la
re
nc
e
Pa
ge
t
L
47
7
W
.W
.P
oc
oc
k
L
22
8
C
.C
ap
pe
r
C
41
3
18
68
19
06
E.
H
.K
.H
ug
es
se
n
L
93
3
H
.A
.B
ra
ss
ey
L
92
3
H
.W
or
m
s
C
71
0
N
ot
es
:C
=
C
on
se
rv
at
iv
e,
L
=
Li
be
ra
l,
H
on
.=
ho
no
ur
ab
le
,B
t.
=
ba
ro
ne
t.
So
ur
ce
:C
ra
ig
(1
97
7)
.
A8
Ta
bl
e
A
7.
R
ol
e
of
vo
te
bu
yi
ng
,s
pl
it
vo
te
s.
50
th
pe
rc
en
ti
le
75
th
pe
rc
en
ti
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
1[
W
or
ki
ng
cl
as
s]
0.
04
6*
**
0.
04
4*
**
0.
04
7*
**
0.
04
9*
**
0.
04
6*
**
0.
04
4*
**
0.
04
7*
**
0.
04
9*
**
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
13
]
1[
Ye
ar
≥1
86
5]
-0
.0
97
**
*
-0
.0
97
**
*
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
14
]
1[
W
or
ki
ng
cl
as
s]
×1
[Y
ea
r≥
18
65
]
-0
.0
21
-0
.0
19
-0
.0
27
-0
.0
24
-0
.0
21
-0
.0
19
-0
.0
27
-0
.0
24
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
18
]
1[
Vo
la
ti
le
w
or
ki
ng
cl
as
s]
0.
04
7*
**
0.
04
1*
**
0.
04
1*
**
0.
04
3*
**
0.
04
7*
**
0.
04
1*
**
0.
04
1*
**
0.
04
3*
**
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
14
]
1[
Vo
la
ti
le
m
id
dl
e
cl
as
s]
0.
11
6*
**
0.
11
0*
**
0.
09
7*
**
0.
09
6*
**
0.
11
6*
**
0.
11
0*
**
0.
09
7*
**
0.
09
6*
**
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
13
]
[0
.0
13
]
1[
Vo
la
ti
le
m
id
dl
e
cl
as
s]
×1
[Y
ea
r≥
18
65
]
-0
.0
20
-0
.0
13
-0
.0
23
-0
.0
15
-0
.0
20
-0
.0
13
-0
.0
23
-0
.0
15
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
21
]
1[
Vo
la
ti
le
w
or
ki
ng
cl
as
s]
×1
[Y
ea
r≥
18
65
]
-0
.0
94
**
*
-0
.0
90
**
*
-0
.1
01
**
*
-0
.0
79
**
*
-0
.0
94
**
*
-0
.0
90
**
*
-0
.1
01
**
*
-0
.0
79
**
*
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
20
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
19
]
C
on
st
an
t
0.
15
2*
**
0.
21
5*
**
0.
16
3*
**
0.
13
9*
**
0.
15
2*
**
0.
21
5*
**
0.
16
3*
**
0.
13
9*
**
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
16
]
N
10
35
0
10
35
0
10
35
0
10
35
0
10
35
0
10
35
0
10
35
0
10
35
0
R
2
0.
03
0.
07
0.
12
0.
16
0.
03
0.
07
0.
12
0.
16
El
ec
ti
on
ye
ar
FE
N
o
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
o
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Pa
ri
sh
/C
on
st
it
ue
nc
y
FE
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
N
o
El
ec
ti
on
ye
ar
-C
on
st
it
ue
nc
y
FE
N
o
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
N
ot
es
:
O
nl
y
ge
ne
ra
l
el
ec
ti
on
s
ar
e
in
cl
ud
ed
.
Th
e
ou
tc
om
e
is
du
m
m
y
fo
r
ca
st
in
g
a
sp
lit
vo
te
.
Es
ti
m
at
es
ar
e
co
nd
it
io
na
l
on
vo
ti
ng
.
D
at
a
fr
om
al
l
th
re
e
co
ns
ti
tu
en
ci
es
ar
e
po
ol
ed
to
ge
th
er
.
R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
by
vo
te
r
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.*
,*
*
an
d
**
*
de
no
te
st
at
is
ti
ca
ls
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
at
10
%
,5
%
an
d
1%
le
ve
ls
,r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
A9
Ta
bl
e
A
8.
R
ol
e
of
vo
te
bu
yi
ng
,l
ib
er
al
vo
te
s.
50
th
pe
rc
en
ti
le
75
th
pe
rc
en
ti
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
1[
W
or
ki
ng
cl
as
s]
-0
.0
66
**
*
-0
.0
64
**
*
-0
.0
66
**
*
-0
.0
63
**
*
-0
.0
66
**
*
-0
.0
64
**
*
-0
.0
66
**
*
-0
.0
63
**
*
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
23
]
1[
Ye
ar
≥1
86
5]
0.
06
9*
**
0.
06
9*
**
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
26
]
1[
W
or
ki
ng
cl
as
s]
×1
[Y
ea
r≥
18
65
]
0.
06
4*
0.
06
1*
0.
06
4*
0.
05
6
0.
06
4*
0.
06
1*
0.
06
4*
0.
05
6
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
35
]
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
36
]
[0
.0
35
]
1[
Vo
la
ti
le
w
or
ki
ng
cl
as
s]
0.
00
3
0.
00
6
0.
00
6
0.
00
7
0.
00
3
0.
00
6
0.
00
6
0.
00
7
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
25
]
[0
.0
24
]
[0
.0
24
]
1[
Vo
la
ti
le
m
id
dl
e
cl
as
s]
-0
.0
57
**
*
-0
.0
53
**
-0
.0
42
**
-0
.0
37
*
-0
.0
57
**
*
-0
.0
53
**
-0
.0
42
**
-0
.0
37
*
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
21
]
[0
.0
21
]
1[
Vo
la
ti
le
m
id
dl
e
cl
as
s]
×1
[Y
ea
r≥
18
65
]
-0
.0
50
-0
.0
52
-0
.0
51
-0
.0
58
-0
.0
50
-0
.0
52
-0
.0
51
-0
.0
58
[0
.0
39
]
[0
.0
39
]
[0
.0
39
]
[0
.0
38
]
[0
.0
39
]
[0
.0
39
]
[0
.0
39
]
[0
.0
38
]
1[
Vo
la
ti
le
w
or
ki
ng
cl
as
s]
×1
[Y
ea
r≥
18
65
]
0.
12
3*
**
0.
12
3*
**
0.
12
2*
**
0.
10
3*
**
0.
12
3*
**
0.
12
3*
**
0.
12
2*
**
0.
10
3*
**
[0
.0
34
]
[0
.0
34
]
[0
.0
34
]
[0
.0
34
]
[0
.0
34
]
[0
.0
34
]
[0
.0
34
]
[0
.0
34
]
C
on
st
an
t
0.
47
2*
**
0.
49
9*
**
0.
53
6*
**
0.
51
7*
**
0.
47
2*
**
0.
49
9*
**
0.
53
6*
**
0.
51
7*
**
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
23
]
N
10
35
0
10
35
0
10
35
0
10
35
0
10
35
0
10
35
0
10
35
0
10
35
0
R
2
0.
01
0.
04
0.
05
0.
08
0.
01
0.
04
0.
05
0.
08
El
ec
ti
on
ye
ar
FE
N
o
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
o
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Pa
ri
sh
/C
on
st
it
ue
nc
y
FE
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
N
o
El
ec
ti
on
ye
ar
-C
on
st
it
ue
nc
y
FE
N
o
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
N
ot
es
:
O
nl
y
ge
ne
ra
l
el
ec
ti
on
s
ar
e
in
cl
ud
ed
.
Th
e
ou
tc
om
e
is
du
m
m
y
fo
r
ca
st
in
g
a
lib
er
al
vo
te
.
Es
ti
m
at
es
ar
e
co
nd
it
io
na
l
on
vo
ti
ng
.
D
at
a
fr
om
al
l
th
re
e
co
ns
ti
tu
en
ci
es
ar
e
po
ol
ed
to
ge
th
er
.
R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
by
vo
te
r
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.*
,*
*
an
d
**
*
de
no
te
st
at
is
ti
ca
ls
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
at
10
%
,5
%
an
d
1%
le
ve
ls
,r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
A10
